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Abstract:  
The Chinese government has recently expanded the scope of urban social insurance 
programmes. However, social protection for the labour force of urban informal sector, 
which reaches about half the number of urban workers, lags significantly behind. This 
under-coverage may be due to institutional constraints, particularly the household 
registration system (hukou), and self-selection behaviour related to the limited 
benefits of social insurance. Drawing on a recent nationwide individual-level survey 
and city-level statistics, this study examines these two explanations for the 
under-enrolment of social insurance programme. First, results suggest that hukou and 
the intergovernmental fiscal system are major institutional constraints. Second, 
self-selection behaviour in programme enrolment is verified. Employers in the 
informal sector are likely to opt out of social insurance. More importantly, employers 
in the informal sector with rural or non-local hukou are also likely to opt out of social 
insurance, which suggests that self-selection behaviour is constrained by institutions. 
Such findings have important implications for broad theoretical and policy debates on 
universal social protection.   
Key words: social protection, social insurance programme, informal sector, 
institutional constraints, self-selection, China 
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Introduction 
Renewed concern has emerged for the universal coverage of social protection because 
of restricted livelihood opportunities and high levels of poverty under globalisation 
labour market segmentation (Canagarajah and Sethuraman, 2001; United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development [UNRISD], 2012; International Labour 
Organization [ILO], 2014). The recent joint statement on universal social protection 
initiative by the World Bank Group and ILO indicated that universal social protection 
refers to ‘the integrated set of policies designed to ensure income security and support 
to people across the life cycle by paying particular attention to the poor and the 
vulnerable’ (ILO, 2015). Therefore, two conditions must be fulfilled for universal 
coverage: (1) everyone should enrol in a social programme and (2) sufficient financial 
protection must be provided for each enrollee.  
Many developed and developing countries adopt social insurance programmes 
to secure protection from income insecurity caused by sickness, maternity, 
employment injury, unemployment and old age (Kim, 2001; ILO, 2014; Kim, 2016). 
The outcomes of the interaction between social insurance and labour market policies 
in developed countries have long been heatedly debated. These debates have 
highlighted the role of institutional constraints, particularly labour market structure 
and policy regulation, in restricting universal access to social protection. For example, 
discussions on increasing conditionalities on contribution and work requirement for 
social insurance are ongoing (Sjöberg, 1999; Shutes, 2016). Other discussions on 
institutional constraints in this context include liberalisation or dualisation of pension 
and unemployment policy reforms and their impacts on an insider–outsider social 
division (Erlinghagen and Knuth, 2010; Clasen and Goerne, 2011; Bridgen and Meyer, 
2014).  
China adopts the social insurance approach to protect its citizens. Since the 
mid-1980s, the Chinese government has initiated various types of social insurance to 
settle the social unrest of millions of laid-off urban workers and facilitate the reform of 
state-owned enterprises (Wong and Ngok, 2006; Hu, 2015). However, the social 
protection for the labour force of the urban informal sector generally lags significantly 
behind in China (Kumar and Li, 2007; Rickne, 2013; Guo, et al., 2016). Following the 
literature, the current study defines the informal sector labour force as working people 
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with informality in either outside the formal sector enterprises (e.g. urban-registered 
private enterprises, most of which are small scaled, or individual businesses), or 
employment relation (e.g. without a written contract, flexibly employed or 
self-employed).  
The number of urban labour force that work outside the formal sector 
enterprises has accounted for over half of the total urban labour force in recent years. 
Given the large size of this sector, the social protection for its members has a 
significant impact over social and economic developments for three reasons. First, it 
is important to achieve a universal coverage by protecting people at high risks in 
health and employment (Wang et al., 2015). Furthermore, a broad enrolment of social 
insurance is pivotal when aging becomes a serious concern in China. Continuous 
contribution from a majority of the working age population is crucial for the financial 
sustainability of social insurance. The third reason is that, China has highlighted the 
economic strategy as an innovation-driven economy in the 13th Five-Year Plan 
(2016–2020). A broad coverage of social safety net beyond the urban formal sector 
encourages risk-taking innovation, entrepreneurship and the formation of a flexible 
labour market (Guo and Wang, 2016). 
Compared with the formal sector counterparts, the informal sector labour force 
is less likely to enrol in social insurance for two possible reasons. First, the 
institutional discrimination of hukou (household registration status) and the 
occupation-based welfare regime persist (Ringen and Ngok, 2013). Some informal 
sector labours are not fully eligible to enrol for social insurance programmes if they 
do not have a local hukou or written labour contract. Second, given the weak 
enforcement of labour inspection, the informal labour force (e.g. self-employed and 
flexibly employed workers) possesses considerable discretion to determine their 
enrolment than those working in the formal sector. Members of the informal labour 
force may voluntarily opt out of a social insurance. 
Since 2003, the Chinese government has begun to shift its governance priority 
to social policy, including the provision of a universal social protection coverage 
(Wang, 2008). Two main developments may encourage the labour force of the 
informal sector to enrol in social insurance. First, new social programmes have been 
initiated to cover social groups that were previously excluded in social insurances. In 
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the 2000s, the government initiated pension schemes and health insurances for urban 
and rural residents, flexibly employed, peasants and migrant workers (Gao, et al., 
2013; Giles, et al., 2013; Huang, 2014; Ngok, 2016). 
Second, the hukou constraint was relaxed in 2002 in terms of public service 
access. One of the signature initiatives in local policy experiments is to grant migrant 
workers (workers without local hukou) equal access to social insurance programmes. 
Migrant workers who have local residence status and labour contracts can access 
social insurance programmes that were previously accessible to local urban workers 
only. Accordingly, the insider–outsider boundary is shifting from a rigid urban–rural 
division to a within–without criterion (Shi, 2012; Cheng et al., 2014).  
Overall, social insurance programmes have been reconfigured to become 
further inclusive and universal; however, questions exist regarding these two recent 
moves in achieving universal coverage. Hukou and occupation-based elements may 
remain pervasive after the expansion of social protection because social insurance is 
managed by the local government, and most social benefits are not portable across 
cities and regions (Ringen and Ngok, 2013).  
The current research investigates the determinants of enrolment in social 
insurance for the informal sector labour force in urban China in light of the preceding 
discussion. This study draws on the nationally representative survey data collected in 
2012, and determines that the labour force of the informal sector has significant 
disadvantages in social protection. The non-local and rural hukou and the 
intergovernmental fiscal system are major institutional constraints in achieving a 
universal coverage of social protection. The present study suggests that the informal 
sector workers who have urban and local hukou and reside in a city with large fiscal 
capacity are likely to enrol in social insurances. Also, employers of the urban informal 
sector, who have more discretion than employees over their enrolment status, are 
likely to self-select to opt out of social insurances. In addition, the self-selection 
behaviour is constrained by institutions, such as hukou. Employers in the urban 
informal sector without local or urban hukou are likely to opt out of social insurances 
than those with hukou. 
The contributions of this research are threefold. First, this study provides a 
comprehensive view of social insurance coverage based on nationally representative 
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individual- and city-level data. Furthermore, this study is the first thorough 
investigation of the disadvantages of the informal sector labour force in social 
protection in urban China. Institutional constraints and self-selection behaviour are 
highlighted as reasons for the undercoverage of social programmes for the labour 
force of the urban informal sector. Last but not least, this research reveals the 
interaction between self-selection behaviour and institutional constraints. The 
integrative explanation of institutional arrangement and individual behaviour provides 
new insights into the understanding of the undercoverage of social protection for the 
informal sector labour force. 
Informal Sector Labour Force and Fragmented Social Insurance in 
China 
The definition of informal sector is extensively discussed in the literature. ILO has 
adopted the concept of informal sector as one that describes the profit-making 
activities that are ‘small in scale and limited by simple technologies, little capital and 
lack of links with the other sector’ (Bangasser, 2000). In 2003, the 17th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians endorsed to complement the enterprise-based 
definition of informal sector with an extensive, labour-based concept of informal 
employment. ILO supported the measurement adjustment to include both 
‘employment in the informal sector’ and ‘informal employment’ as the informal 
sector (Hussmanns, 2004).  
The current research follows the literature to include two non-exclusive groups 
as the labour force of the urban informal sector. The first group is defined by the 
registration status of enterprises. The urban informal sector includes registered private 
enterprises and individual businesses. In China, the majority of private enterprises are 
small-scale. The average number of employees in a private enterprise in 2013 was 
approximately 10.4 (National Bureau of Statistics [NBS], 2013). A nationwide survey 
indicated that only 1.1% of private enterprises had over 100 employees in 2005 (Huang, 
2013). In this context, private enterprises are generally considered the informal sector 
in the literature (Ghose, 2005; Hu and Zhao, 2006). The second group is defined by the 
type of employment relation. Individuals without a written employment contract are 
categorised under informal employment (Ghose, 2005; Kumar and Li, 2007; Park and 
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Cai, 2011). The informal sector labour force for both groups can be employees or (self) 
employers. 
The current fragmented social insurance regime in China exacerbates the 
undercoverage of the informal sector labour force. The fragmentation has two 
dimensions, namely, rural–urban/regional division and occupation-based programmes 
(Ngok, 2016). The first type of fragmentation is based on the hukou status and locality. 
Chinese people under the hukou system are divided into two categories, namely, rural 
and urban residents. Hukou also divides people based on their residence location. 
Significant differences are identified between rural and urban residents, as well as 
amongst residents across different regions, in terms of the scope, coverage and benefit 
levels of social insurance programmes (Gao, et al., 2013; Ngok, 2016).  
The second fragmentation type is based on occupations and employment sectors. 
Public servants and urban workers belong to different social insurance programmes 
(Ringen and Ngok, 2013; Ngok, 2016). In recent years, new programmes that target 
local residents without formal employment have been initiated in several 
metropolises.1 This two-dimensional fragmentation currently makes interregional and 
cross-category transfers nearly impossible. These institutional settings decrease the 
effectiveness of risk pooling and financial protection. 
Against the institutional context, the loose enforcement of labour inspection 
causes the enrolment of social insurance programmes for the urban informal sector to 
be generally dependent on the decision of employers and employees. In the current 
research, ‘employers’ in the informal sector refer to the self-employed and small 
business owners. Employers can decide on their own whether to enrol in social 
insurance programmes. ‘Employees’ in the informal sector include workers with 
informal employment and workers hired by small businesses. For employees, 
enrolment in social insurance requires contributions paid by employers and employees 
in proportion to their payrolls and wages. Table 1 summarises the contribution rates to 
each social insurance programme. Contribution and benefit varies across social 
insurances. Regarding to those urban basic employee programmes, the contributions 
are proportional to payroll and wage of individuals. The benefits (except for the 
pension programme) are not contribution-related and often based on the economic 
conditions of a particular city. In terms of the pension and health insurance for urban 
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residents (not the case for another three insurances), the contributions and benefits are 
in a lump sum decided by the local government. 
--- Table 1 approximately here --- 
The decision of employers in the informal sector on whether to contribute to the 
social insurance account of their employees can have an impact on the enrolment 
status of the latter (Guo et al., 2016). Although employers in the informal sector can 
opt not to contribute to their employees’ accounts in pension or health insurance plans, 
the latter can constantly register for urban resident plans for pension and health 
insurance, for which the contribution from the former is unnecessary. Hence, 
employers and employees in the informal sector can make enrolment decisions. 
Nevertheless, employers in the informal sector have more substantial discretion for 
their enrolment in social insurance than employees. 
 
Institutional Constraints and Self-selection Behaviour  
The enrolment of social programmes is the result of interaction between institutions 
and actors. Studies on labour market segmentation and social protection for the labour 
force of the informal sector (van Ginneken, 1999; Pellissery and Walker, 2007; 
Shaefer, 2010) have identified the following main pervasive factors that contribute to 
inadequate coverage:  
(1) Government’s institutional settings: extent of the benefits, institutional 
restrictions on enrolment eligibility, and administrative barriers on 
re-enrolment and portability of social benefits. 
(2) Employers and employees’ resistance: low financial and policy literacy, 
distrust in public institutions and insurance programmes, unattractive 
programme design and additional financial costs. 
The current study suggests that institutional constraints and self-selection are 
crucial determinants of enrolment in social insurance programmes by the labour force 
of the urban informal sector. Institutional constraints in this study refer to specific 
rules, procedures and practices that are treated as given for individuals who create 
patterned behaviour and interactions (Lowndes and Roerts, 2013). Hukou is a major 
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institutional constraint for programme enrolment in China. The labour market in 
China is dichotomised between rural and urban areas, as well as varies across regions. 
Rural and non-local hukou may be institutional barriers that create higher enrolment 
costs of social insurance programmes for the informal sector labour force than those 
created by local urban hukou. For example, the unemployment insurance benefits in 
Beijing can only be claimed from the place where the hukou of the beneficiary is 
registered. Accordingly, claiming benefits is difficult for those whose hukou is not 
registered in Beijing.2 Thus, the informal sector workers with rural and non-local 
hukou are unlikely to enrol in social insurance programmes. In 2014, only 16.4% of 
rural migrant workers contributed to a basic pension scheme; 18.2% and 9.8% 
registered for health and unemployment insurances, respectively (NBS, 2015). These 
figures are significantly below the average in urban China. 
Hukou has been discussed as an institutional constraint for social insurance 
participation in several empirical studies. Moreover, various studies based on 
city-level survey and national panel data  showed that the members of the informal 
sector labour force who are employed by private enterprises or who are self-employed, 
particularly migrant workers without local hukou, are unlikely to be covered by 
employment-based social insurance programmes in urban China (Gao et al., 2012; 
Park et al., 2012; Chen and Gallagher, 2013; Giles et al., 2013; Gao and Rickne, 2015). 
These findings are consistent with those of other similar household surveys in Shanghai 
(Nyland et al., 2006) and Jiangsu Province (Nielsen et al., 2005). 
The intergovernmental fiscal system which determines the local fiscal capacity 
is another major institutional constraint. Sufficient local fiscal capacity is pivotal to 
expand the coverage and improve the benefits of social insurance. From 2003 to 2009, 
the coverage for rural residents under the New Rural Cooperative Health Scheme 
increased from 13% to 94% because of government subsidies that accounted for nearly 
90% of contributions (Barber and Yao, 2010). The majority share of government 
subsidy has been financed by the local government. For example, the local government 
provided approximately 56% of subsidy for urban resident health insurance in 20123. 
However, the current intergovernmental fiscal system mandates that major tax 
revenue is assigned to the central government, whereas responsibilities for financing 
and providing public services have been delegated to the local government (Wong and 
Bird, 2008). In 2015, the local government accounted for over 86% of the total 
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government expenditure but approximately 54% of the total government revenue4. In 
this context, local governments with limited fiscal capacity may provide social 
insurance only for residents with local and urban hukou, and may lack strong 
incentives to implement universal coverage and improve the benefit level. This 
situation is the spatial injustice outcome of territorial fragmentation which localises 
and regionalises social protection (Shi, 2012; Ngok, 2016).  
Self-selection in the current study refers to the purposeful actions of people in 
response to a state policy. The self-selection behaviour of the informal sector labour 
force for social insurance enrolment is based on the assumption of self-interest of 
individuals and their rational analysis of risks, costs and benefits (Rueda, 2005; 
Blekesaune, 2007). A few members of the urban informal sector may opt to forego 
enrolling in social programmes if the benefits are trivial.  
Employers in the informal sector are likely to forego enrolling with social 
insurance; they have considerable discretion over their own enrolment status. The 
regressive effect of social insurance (Liu et al., 2015) and limited portability of social 
benefits under the decentralised and regionalised social insurance (Shi, 2012) may 
discourage the informal sector employers from enrolling in social insurance in two 
aspects. First, if informal sector employers believe that the benefit of social insurance 
programmes is not good enough, they are more likely to opt out compared to 
employees. Second, informal sector employers who lack a local or urban hukou are 
likely to opt out of social insurance programmes because they are unlikely to enjoy 
the benefit of social insurance. 
In short, the labour force of the urban informal sector is refrained from enrolling 
in social insurance by institutional constraints (e.g. hukou). The labour force of the 
informal sector, particularly employers, may also opt out of social insurance 
programmes if the financial benefits of the social insurance are insufficient. 
Employers with rural or non-local hukou are even more likely to opt out of social 
insurance programmes compared to other employers.  
 10 
 
Methods 
Data  
This study draws on individual- and city-level data. Individual-level data are sourced 
from the China Labour-force Dynamics Survey (CLDS) 2012, a nationally 
representative household survey conducted by Sun Yat-sen University, China. 5 
CLDS 2012 focused on the labour dynamics in China and included the detailed 
information of individuals related to the labour market. CLDS respondents were 
labourers aged 15 to 64 and selected from the 29 provinces of Mainland China, 
excluding Tibet and Hainan (see details on the CLDS 2012 in the Appendix).  
The analysis is restricted to a sample of urban individuals who are engaged in 
non-farming work. A total of 3,160 individuals from 57 city-level units are extracted 
from CLDS 2012. Individual-level data are merged with contextual data for 57 
city-level units in 2011. The data are drawn from the China Premium Database6 
which provides city-level statistics.  
The combined data sets have three main advantages when analysing social 
insurance for the labour force of the informal sector. To start with, the data set that 
comprises the official statistics of 57 cities and individual-level observations in China 
considers regional variations. Prior studies suggested substantial regional variations in 
social insurance enrolment. For example, the coverage rate of health insurance for all 
individuals aged 16 to 60 in Shanghai (89%) is more than twice the rate in Wuhan 
(39%) (Giles et al., 2006, 2013). CLDS 2012 with city-level statistics prompted the 
critical analysis of the national development of social insurance programmes whilst 
considering the city-level variations. Large variations in the contextual variables 
across cities provide adequate statistical power to analyse the influence of city-level 
characteristics on the programme enrolment of individuals. 
In addition, the CLDS data set included a large number of observations of 
migrant workers which are crucial for analysing the social protection for the urban 
labour force. China has witnessed a significant increase in the number of migrant 
workers with the rural hukou working in urban areas. However, the inclusion of 
migrant workers in household surveys is a challenge because they cannot be identified 
in official registrations (Gustafsson et al., 2014). The current study draws on an 
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inclusive sample from CLDS 2012 with migrants and non-migrants, as well as 
provides accurate estimations of the social protection for the entire labour force of the 
informal sector. 
Last but not least, the data reflect the updated policy outcomes amidst social 
protection expansion. In the era of social reform, the Labour Contract Law and Social 
Insurance Law were implemented in 2008 and 2011, respectively. CLDS 2012 
precisely covered the social protection expansion and the enactment of policy 
regulation in China since 2003 (Shi, 2012; Gao et al., 2013; Ringen and Ngok, 2013; 
Huang, 2014). 
Measures 
The dependent variables are enrolments in three types of social insurance programmes: 
(1) basic employee/resident pension schemes, (2) urban employee/resident basic 
health insurance and (3) other types of social insurance, including unemployment, 
work-related injury and maternity insurance. To avoid underestimating the social 
insurance coverage in urban areas, the enrolment status is considered positive if 
individuals enrol with any social insurance programmes for urban workers or 
residents. Data analysis also includes the enrolment status of private commercial 
pension and health insurance as dependent variables for robustness check.  
Informal Sector Employment (formal = 0) refers to people who work in private 
enterprises and individual businesses, as well as individuals under informal 
employment (i.e. working without a written contract or flexibly employed). (See 
details in the Appendix).  
Institutional constraints are measured as the hukou status of individuals and 
fiscal revenue per capita of a city. The hukou status is classified into urban/rural and 
local/non-local. The city-level fiscal revenue is measured in per capita of 2011 and in 
RMB 1,000 (approximately USD 145). The fiscal revenue and other city-level 
controls are measured in their lagged value to avoid endogeneity problem in 
regression analysis (i.e. 2011 statistics). 
Self-selection behaviour is measured by employment status. Employers in the 
informal sector have considerable discretion over their own enrolment status. If 
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employers are likely to opt out or enrol in social insurance programmes, then the 
finding implies the self-selection behaviour of employers.  
Individual-level characteristics are controlled, including three dummy 
variables (i.e. gender (male = 0), work status (employed = 0) and employment status 
(employee = 0)) and three continuous variables (i.e. education (years of schooling), 
age and income). The income variable is considered in the logarithm.  
City-level contextual measures are also included as controls, including gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, social security and employment expenditure and 
government health expenditure for 2011; these measures are measured in per capita. 
Social security and employment expenditure includes government expenditure under 
the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Scheme (Dibao), as well as basic social 
assistance government expenditures on social security subsidies and expenditures for 
retired government employees. Social security and employment expenditures cover 
programme benefits. These benefits mainly target people who are not working in the 
formal sector, such as retirees and beneficiaries of social assistance programmes. 
Social security and employment expenditure per capita is a relevant variable because 
the benefit of social assistance programmes may affect the enrolment rate of social 
insurance types. For example, medical assistance is a social assistance programme 
that provides financial coverage for the health care of the urban poor. Similarly, the 
Dibao programme provides financial coverage for the urban poor who may be 
unemployed as well. A few urban workers in the informal sector may want to claim 
benefits from social assistance and not enrol in social insurance, such as 
unemployment or health insurance types. Thus, the enrolment rate of social insurance 
may be decreased if the benefit level of social assistance is sufficiently high (Qian and 
Mok 2016). 
Moreover, the enrolment rate is affected by the benefit level of social 
insurance; such benefit level is increased with local social expenditure. The official 
number of city-level government budget allocated for social insurance is unavailable. 
Thus, government health expenditure is used as a proxy to measure the benefit of 
social insurance. 
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Analytic Strategy  
A multilevel mixed-effect binary logistic regression model is employed to analyse the 
data. The first set of analyses evaluates the advantages of the informal sector labour 
force in terms of enrolment in social insurance programmes. Individual-level control 
variables include gender, employment status, education, age and income. The vectors 
of city-level variables, including GDP per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, social 
security and employment expenditure per capita and government health expenditure 
per capita, are also controlled. 
The second set of analyses focuses on the labour force of the urban informal 
sector and analyses the determinants of their programme enrolments. The effects of 
the two types of hukou status (i.e. basic control and city-level contextual variables) are 
analysed. 
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
In the analysis sample of 3,160 individuals, 2,067 are the informal sector labour force, 
thereby accounting for 65.4% of the total working sample (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix for the descriptive statistics of the individual variables). On the basis of the 
registration status of enterprises, a few scholars used data in statistical yearbooks to 
estimate that the share of the urban informal sector workers was 56.8% in 2002 
(Ghose, 2005, p. 27) and 58.7% by 2004 (Hu and Zhao, 2006). In the sample of the 
current study, the number of workers in the informal sector enterprises is 1,635 (51.7% 
of the total observations in 2012) which is consistent with the yearbook data cited in 
the literature. However, the definition of the informal sector in the present study is 
broader than that in the yearbook because the former also includes workers under 
informal employment (i.e. without a formal labour contract) but working in the formal 
sector enterprises7. The percentage of informal employment in the formal sector in 
2012 is 13.7% of the analysis sample (see Table A2 in the Appendix). This ratio is 
also consistent with findings in other studies. Xue and Gao (2012) estimated that 
informal employment in the formal sector accounted for approximately 11.1% of the 
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total urban labour force based on the 2005 China One Percent Population Sample 
Survey, which was conducted by National Bureau of Statistics. The relatively high 
proportion of the informal labour force reported in the current study is therefore 
conceivable because the informal employment in the formal sector is also included. 
The descriptive statistics also shows that enrolment in social insurance 
programmes is not universal. The figures in Table 2 suggest that the enrolment rate of 
the formal labour force ranges from 78% to 95% which is nearly twice that of the 
labour force of the informal sector. The labour force of the informal sector comprises 
the employees and employers (including self-employed and small business owners). 
In our sample, over 70% of the employers are reported as self-employed (see Figure 
A1 in the Appendix for details). For the informal labour sector, the programme 
enrolment rates of employers are lower than those of employees. Table A3 
summarises the descriptive statistics of the contextual variables for the 57 city-level 
divisions (see Appendix). 
--- Table 2 approximately here --- 
 
Disadvantage of the Informal Sector in the Programme Enrolments 
Table 3 presents the results of the mixed-effect logistic regression models that predict 
the likelihood of enrolment in three types of social insurance programmes, namely, 
pension, health insurance and other social insurance programmes. The differences 
between the labour force of the formal and informal sectors are compared in terms of 
their accessibility to the three types of social insurance programmes which are 
conditional on the individual- and city-level characteristics. The results reported in 
Table 3 suggest that the social protection of the informal sector labour force is less 
than that of the formal sector labour force. For the labour force of the formal and 
informal sectors, the rural hukou, non-local hukou, fiscal capacity, income and 
education are positively correlated with the likelihood of programme enrolment. 
--- Table 3 approximately here --- 
 
 15 
 
Determinants of Programme Enrolment: Institutional Constraints  
Table 4 shows the estimated multilevel mixed-effect logistic regression models that 
predict the probability of insurance programme enrolment for the labour force of the 
informal sector. The results reveal that the rural and non-local hukou statuses are 
significant institutional constraints to achieve the universal coverage of social 
insurance, particularly for enrolment in Models 1, 2 and 3. The findings support the 
argument that the labour force of the informal sector with non-local and rural hukou is 
less likely to enrol in social insurance programmes. The significance of the 
urban/rural hukou and local/non-local hukou differs across programmes. Rural hukou 
is a larger constraint than non-local hukou in health insurance enrolment which 
includes urban employee and resident health insurance.  
City fiscal revenue has positive and significant effects on enrolment in social 
health insurance and basic pension schemes (i.e. Models 1 and 2). Thus, 
intergovernmental fiscal system which defines local fiscal capacity is another critical 
institutional constraint. These results suggest that the labour force of the informal 
sector in a city with large fiscal capacity is likely to enrol in social programmes. 
Social security and employment expenditure is negatively associated with the 
enrolment rate of pension and social health insurance but is insignificant.  
--- Table 4 approximately here --- 
 
Determinants of Programme Enrolment: Self-selection  
The results reveal the self-selection behaviour in programme enrolment. Employers 
often have discretionary power to decide their programme enrolment. They are likely to 
self-select to enrol in programmes. Table 4 shows that employers in the informal 
sector are more likely to opt out of social insurance programmes than employees do 
(i.e. Models 1, 2 and 3). However, employers are more likely to purchase private 
commercial pension and health insurance (i.e. Models 4 and 5). The results suggest 
that the benefits of social insurance programmes may not be attractive to employers in 
the informal sector. Rather, employers will opt for private commercial programmes.  
Income is positively and statistically significant in Model 3. The income effect 
is positive in ‘other’ insurance reported in Model 3 because the amount of 
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contribution for employees is not income related for maternity and injury insurance 
(see Table 1). In this case, high-income workers may be more likely to afford to enrol 
in ‘other insurance’ than low-income workers may. By contrast, income is statistically 
insignificant in Model 1 and only marginally significant in Model 2. For basic 
employee pension and health insurance, the contribution is income-related particularly 
for employees. High-income workers may lack a strong incentive to enrol because 
they need to contribute substantially.  
 
Determinants of Programme Enrolment: Interaction between Institutional 
Constraints and Self-selection 
The self-selection behaviour of employers in the informal sector is constrained by 
institutions, such as hukou. Table 5 shows the effects of institutional constraints on 
employers in the informal sector. Compared with the informal sector employers with 
urban/local hukou, employers with rural/non-local hukou in the informal sector are 
less likely to enrol in pension and health insurance programmes (i.e. Models 1 and 2 
in Table 5). The findings suggest that the degree of self-selection is affected by the 
hukou constraints. Employers with rural or non-local hukou in the informal sector are 
likely to opt out of social programmes because the benefits of these programmes are 
often non-transferable across cities or from urban to rural areas. Accordingly, the 
institutional constraints from hukou magnify this self-selection effect. Fiscal revenue 
remains to be a significant determinant of programme enrolment in the analysis in 
Table 5, thereby suggesting that governments with strong fiscal capacity may be able 
to provide good social benefits that are attractive to employers in the informal sector.  
Table 5 shows that the coefficient of income is insignificant. That is, no 
significant difference is obtained in enrolment decision amongst employers with 
different income levels. High-income employers may want to enrol with the urban 
resident pension and health insurance, in which the amount of contribution is not 
income-related. In this case, the income effect is insignificant because the resident and 
basic employee insurances are considered social insurance in the current research. 
Amongst the employers in the data sample, 138 are enrolled with urban resident 
health insurance, whereas only 71 are enrolled with basic urban employee health 
insurance.  
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--- Table 5 approximately here --- 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This research comprehensively analyses the participation of the urban informal sector 
labour force in all social insurance programmes after the proactive expansion of social 
protection in the past decade in China. This study uses the nationally representative 
household survey and city-level statistics as bases to reveal that the labour force of the 
informal sector remains significantly disadvantaged in social insurance participation, 
and the social protection in urban China remains has yet to become universal. 
This research empirically proves that institutional constraints, self-selection 
behaviour and their interactive effects are the main determinants for the 
undercoverage of social protection of the informal sector labour force in urban China. 
The effects of self-selection and institutional constraints of hukou on social insurance 
can be supported by a recent report from official media. Migrant workers who are 
mainly subject to the institutional constraint of hukou are more likely to ‘voluntarily’ 
undercontribute to social insurance programmes than other urban labour forces.8  
The labour force of the informal sector is subject to certain institutional 
constraints (e.g. hukou status and intergovernmental fiscal system) that determine the 
fiscal capacity of the city of residence. Workers who have urban and local hukou and 
reside in a city with large fiscal capacity are likely to enrol in social insurances. Urban 
and local hukou statuses remain significant determinants of social insurance 
enrolment in urban China, even within the informal sector, where the 
occupation-based welfare system is at its weakest. The findings on institutional 
constraints suggest that the resource distribution function of the hukou system 
prevails.  
Self-selection behaviour is another significant determinant of social insurance 
enrolment. Employers of the urban informal sector have more substantial 
discretionary power than employees in deciding on their enrolment in social insurance 
programmes. Compared to employees, these employers are more unlikely to enrol in 
social insurance. Instead, they are more likely to enrol in private commercial 
insurance programmes compared to employees.  
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In addition, the self-selection behaviour varies based on the hukou status. 
Employers without urban/local hukou are more likely to opt out of social programmes 
than those with urban/local hukou. That is, the former may expect that the benefit 
levels of social insurance programmes are limited for people without urban/local 
hukou. Self-selection in the income dimension may not be completely ruled out, 
although the enrolment status of employers does not vary significantly with income 
level. High-income employers in the informal sector are likely to opt out of the basic 
employee insurance and instead enrol with the urban resident social insurance, under 
which the amount of contributions is fixed and not income related.  
The results are substantially consistent across the pension and health insurance 
programmes which are two key social insurance programmes with similar 
contribution and benefit structure. By contrast, the results are slightly different for the 
‘other’ insurance (i.e. unemployment, work injury and maternity). First, the effect of 
institutional constraints is not as strong for ‘other’ insurance as that for pension and 
health insurance programmes. A substantially smaller amount of government subsidy 
has been allocated to ‘other’ insurance compared to the cases of pension or health 
insurance. For example, the government subsidy for ‘other’ insurances in 2013 merely 
amounted to approximately 0.3% and 0.4% of the subsidy for pension and health 
insurance respectively9. In this case, local fiscal capacity is much less relevant for 
‘other’ insurance than pension/health insurance. Second, the self-selection effect is 
higher for ‘other’ social insurances than pension and health insurance programmes. 
The differences could be due to the different regulatory requirements of the insurance 
enrolment. The Social Insurance Law states that the insurances of unemployment, 
work injury and maternity (these three insurances are defined as ‘other insurance’ in 
this study) are only compulsory for workers with written labour contract. 
This research is embedded in a broad literature that discusses the institutional 
constraints to social protection, including labour market structure and policy 
regulation. The research contribution to the literature is threefold. First, this research 
pioneers in presenting the degree of and reason for the under-enrolment in social 
insurance of the labour force in the urban informal sector. Although social protection 
becomes further inclusive, integrated, generous and progressive in certain 
administrative jurisdictions (Shi, 2012; Gao et al., 2013), the current research shows 
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that the divisions of social insurance in regions and hukou status remain persistent and 
nationwide.  
Second, this research contributes to the literature on the political and economic 
dynamics of the current programme design (Wong et al., 2007; Huang, 2014, 2015; 
Liu et al., 2015). Moreover, the current study provides micro-level evidence of the 
self-selection behaviour of employers in the informal sector who opt out of the social 
programmes because of insufficient benefit level. These findings in China are not 
unique. Similar self-selection behaviour had been observed in other developing 
countries, such as Latin American countries (Berens, 2015).  
Third, the present research reveals that the undercoverage of social insurance 
programmes for the informal sector labour force is a result of the interplay between 
institutional constraints and selection behaviour. This finding contributes in 
understanding the effect of the interplay of enrolment eligibility rules, benefit levels 
and individual conditions on the participation in social insurance. For example, this 
research implies that the interaction between self-selection and hukou status can 
explain why the social insurance enrolment rate of urban migrants is higher than that 
of rural migrants. By contrast, Cheng et al. (2014) emphasised on the role of human 
resource management of performance reward and labour retention. The present 
research also provides a concrete case of the interaction between actors and 
institutions in social policy (UNRISD, 2012; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). Another 
concern on self-selection in programme enrolment is that people may opt to enter the 
informal sector or migrate to a particular city with high benefits from social insurance 
before they consider opting out of social insurance programmes. For example, an 
increasing number of skilled workers opt to work in the informal sector in developed 
regions to enjoy high wages, considerable autonomy and dignity (Huang, 2012). With 
these additional selections on locations and sectors, the real magnitude of the 
self-selection effect on programme enrolment may be even larger than the current 
estimation.  
The findings on the effects of hukou and local fiscal capacity on the universal 
coverage of the informal sector labour force imply that the fragmented social 
insurance regimes in China have significant effects on the urban–rural and spatial 
fragmentations based on the hukou system and territorial inequality of economic 
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development, respectively (Shi, 2012; Ngok, 2016). These findings also suggest that 
institutional constraints, such as the fragmentation of governance (e.g. hukou in China) 
and intergovernmental fiscal system (e.g. the fiscal capacity of a city), are generally 
crucial to achieve a universal coverage of social programmes in developing countries. 
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Notes
                                                     
1 For example, people under informal employment in Guangzhou could join one of the 
health insurance programmes for urban workers or residents (Southern Metropolis 
Daily, June 9, 2015). 
2 Unemployment insurance balance amounted to RMB 300 billion (Shiye baoxian 
jieyu sanqianyi at http://news.sina.com.cn/newobserv/sybx/, accessed on July 20, 
2016).  
3 The central government provided RMB 20 billion out of RMB 46.9 billion as 
subsidy for urban resident health insurance according to 
http://sbs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai/201302/t20130228_739589.ht
ml, accessed on March 27, 2017. 
4  Budget Report 2015, Ministry of Finance at http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2015czys/, 
accessed on July 20, 2016.  
5 See the official webpage of the database at http://css.sysu.edu.cn/Data. The data set 
has been extensively applied to investigate the social and economic conditions of 
the labour force in China (e.g. Xie and Zhou, 2014; Zhang, et al., 2015). 
6 See the official webpage of the database at https://www.ceicdata.com/en/countrie
s/china. 
7 Workers under informal employment but working in the formal sector enterprises 
are considered as formal sector workers in statistical yearbooks. See the definition 
of ‘Employed Staff and Workers’ in the China Statistical Yearbook 2016,  
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/html/zbe04.htm, accessed on March 16, 
2017. 
8 A report by the Hainan provincial government, Social Security Bureau has similar 
observations, November 18, 2016, 
http://www.hi.si.gov.cn/sbxwzxsbxw/20161118/20632.html, accessed on 
November 30, 2016. 
9 In 2013, the government subsidy for pension and health insurance reached RMB 
408.3 and 308.2 billion, respectively. For the other three social insurances, the total 
government subsidy was merely RMB 1.3 billion. See 
http://sbs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai/201305/t20130507_858298.ht
ml , accessed on March 26, 2017. 
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Table 1 Rates of contributions to social insurance programmes in urban China, 2012 
Programme Contribution 
  Whether the benefit is 
proportional to contribution 
Insurance programmes for employees  
 
Employer 
(payroll) 
Employee 
(monthly wage) 
 
Basic pension ≤ 20% ≤ 8%  
Basic health 6% 2% 1 
Unemployment2 2% 1%  
Work injury 1% 0  
Maternity ≤ 1% 0  
Total ≤ 30% ≤ 13%  
Insurance programmes for residents3 
 Resident  
Pension Annual lump sum 4 
Health Annual lump sum  
Sources: Adapted from Giles, et al., 2013. 
Note:  
1. The benefit of social pooling account is not contribution related. But 
reimbursement from individual account is contribution related. 
2. Since 2015, the contribution rate of unemployment insurance for employers has 
decreased from 3% to 2%. See 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-03/04/c_1114523421.htm, accessed July 21, 
2016. 
3. Both the contributions and benefits of resident insurance programmes are in a lump 
sum decided by local government. 
4. Only those residents making a 15-years of contribution are entitled to claim pension 
benefit. 
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Table 2 Enrolment rates of different groups in social insurance programmes (in 
percentage) 
Urban Labour Force (N=3,160) 
Pension 
Programme 
Health 
Programme 
Other Types of 
Social Insurance 
 
Formal sector workers (N = 1,093) 90.29 94.84 77.73  
Informal sector workers (N = 2,067) 46.66 57.71 28.13  
Employers (N = 531) 33.60 41.22 6.81  
Employees (N = 1,536) 51.66 64.03 36.30    
Note: Sampling weights from CLDS 2012 are applied on the enrolment rates. 
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Table 3 Disadvantages of informal sector in programme enrolment, mixed-effects 
logistic regression models, random effects clustered at city levels 
 
Pension 
Programme 
Health 
Programme 
Other Social 
Insurances 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Informal sector  -1.633*** -1.916*** -1.820*** 
(yes = 1) (0.126) (0.172) (0.103) 
Individual-level Characteristics 
Rural hukou  
(yes = 1) 
-1.387*** -1.812*** -0.640*** 
(0.131) (0.139) (0.138) 
Non-local hukou  -0.696*** -0.605*** -0.381** 
(yes = 1) (0.138) (0.151) (0.139) 
Income 0.023*** 0.038*** 0.067*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Education  
(years of schooling) 
0.086*** 0.167*** 0.069*** 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.015) 
Age 0.036*** 0.034*** -0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Gender  0.217* 0.058 -0.260** 
(female = 1) (0.097) (0.111) (0.091) 
City-level Characteristics in 2011   
Fiscal revenue 0.108 0.163* 0.048 
 (0.071) (0.076) (0.060) 
Social security and employment 
expenditure 
-0.370 -0.552 -0.254 
(0.363) (0.379) (0.310) 
Health expenditure 0.048 0.773 0.947+ 
 (0.576) (0.599) (0.494) 
GDP per capita 0.012 0.001 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Intercept 
 
-1.077* -0.777 -0.044 
(0.510) (0.558) (0.457) 
Random Effects    
        Intercept  -0.474*** -0.471** -0.674*** 
(0.143) (0.153) (0.152) 
Wald chi-square  603.48*** 638.21*** 630.92*** 
statistics (df)        (11)         (11)        (11) 
Likelihood ratio tests: 
comparison to one-level model 
74.95*** 52.01*** 53.57*** 
Observations: 3,160 cases in individual level, 57 groups in city level 
Note: The city-level characteristics in 2011 (i.e. GDP per capita, fiscal revenue, social 
security and employment expenditure, and (government) health expenditure) are determined 
per capita and in RMB 1,000. Income was transformed by adding 0.001 and taken the 
logarithm because the original variable includes zero with a skewness of 3.8. “Other types of 
social insurance” include work injury, maternity, and unemployment insurance programmes. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1. 
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Table 4 Determinants of programme enrolment for informal sector workers, 
mixed-effects logistic regression models, random effects clustered at city levels  
 
Social Insurance Programme 
 Private Commercial 
Insurance Programme 
Pension  Health  Other types   Pension Health 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Institutional Constraints  
Rural hukou  
(yes = 1) 
-1.323*** -1.638*** -0.579*** -0.630* -0.342 
(0.146) (0.149) (0.162) (0.269) (0.216) 
Non-local hukou  -0.739*** -0.548*** -0.423** -0.082 -0.232 
(yes = 1) (0.155) (0.161) (0.162) (0.252) (0.211) 
Fiscal revenue of a city in 
2011 
0.162* 0.163* 0.066 0.236* 0.104 
(0.070) (0.079) (0.067) (0.103) (0.086) 
Self-selection Behaviour 
Employer  -0.353* -0.412* -1.263*** 0.790** 0.704** 
(yes = 1) (0.172) (0.179) (0.206) (0.269) (0.223) 
Individual-level Controls      
Income 0.010 0.018+ 0.035*** -0.026+ -0.018 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) 
Education 0.098*** 0.154*** 0.101*** 0.051 0.088*** 
(years of schooling) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.032) (0.026) 
Age 0.035*** 0.030*** -0.018** -0.018+ -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) 
Gender 0.249* 0.068 -0.261* 0.154 0.103 
(female = 1) (0.111) (0.120) (0.111) (0.186) (0.150) 
Formal sector experience 
(yes = 1) 
0.359** 0.732*** 0.018 0.235 0.183 
(0.126) (0.139) (0.130) (0.215) (0.175) 
City-level Control in 2011      
Social security and 
employment expenditure 
-0.542 -0.645 -0.531 -0.038 0.404 
(0.351) (0.393) (0.347) (0.535) (0.464) 
Health expenditure 0.262 0.920 0.980+ -0.777 0.114 
 (0.550) (0.617) (0.537) (0.965) (0.724) 
GDP per capita 0.007 0.002 0.010 -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) 
Intercept  
-2.789*** -2.590*** -1.885*** -2.768** -3.665*** 
(0.533) (0.579) (0.535) (0.881) (0.736) 
Random Effects      
      Intercept -0.593*** -0.460** -0.620*** -0.436+ -0.446* 
(0.162) (0.158) (0.176) (0.248) (0.211) 
Wald chi-square  357.54*** 439.66*** 223.65*** 52.39*** 59.93*** 
statistics (df) (12) (12) (12) (12) (12) 
Likelihood ratio tests: 
comparison to one-level 
model 
45.34*** 45.99*** 35.04*** 13.71*** 24.31*** 
Observations: 2,067 cases in individual level, 57 groups in city level 
Note: Refer to Table 3 of the main text for notes of GDP per capita, fiscal revenue, social 
security and employment expenditure, health expenditure, income, and other types of social 
insurance. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 
0.1. 
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Table 5 Determinants of programme enrolments for employers, mixed-effects logistic 
regression models, random effects clustered at city levels 
 
Pension 
Programme 
Health 
Programme 
Other Types of 
Social Insurance 
(1) (2) (3) 
Institutional Constraints    
Rural hukou  -1.191*** -1.560*** 0.633 
(yes = 1) (0.272) (0.282) (0.500) 
Non-local hukou  -0.776** -0.547+ -1.647** 
(yes = 1) (0.299) (0.308) (0.557) 
Fiscal revenue of a city in 2011 0.244* 0.301* 0.034 
 (0.105) (0.136) (0.140) 
Individual-level Controls    
Income -0.021 -0.002 0.031 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) 
Education 0.102** 0.114** 0.221** 
(years of schooling) (0.039) (0.040) (0.073) 
Age 0.057*** 0.043** 0.006 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) 
Gender 0.541* 0.573* -0.165 
(female = 1) (0.235) (0.240) (0.379) 
Formal sector experience 0.891*** 0.643* 0.833* 
(yes = 1) (0.270) (0.285) (0.414) 
City-level Control in 2011    
Social security and employment 
expenditure 
-0.766 -0.230 1.184 
(0.564) (0.698) (0.780) 
Health expenditure 0.849 0.281 1.318 
 (0.852) (1.110) (1.044) 
GDP per capita 0.000 -0.011 0.013 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) 
Intercept  
-4.761*** -3.462** -7.590*** 
(0.994) (1.073) (1.680) 
Random Effects    
  Intercept -0.780 -0.091 -0.568 
 (0.478) (0.243) (0.603) 
Wald chi-square  100.77*** 94.26*** 43.28*** 
statistics (df) (11) (11) (11) 
Likelihood ratio tests: 
comparison to one-level model 
1.92+ 14.43*** 1.17 
Observations: 531 cases in individual level, 54 groups in city level 
Note: Refer to Table 3 of the main text for notes on GDP per capita, fiscal revenue, social 
security and employment expenditure, health expenditure, income, and other types of social 
insurance. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 
0.1. 
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